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Abstract 
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1. Introduction 
It is now widely accepted that the processes through which new technology is invented, 
commercialized and spread to many users across the global economy are important for 
economic growth, catch-up and development.  
 
Patenting plays a key role for technology diffusion. On the one hand, intellectual 
property rights (IPRs) limit technology diffusion since imitation becomes illegal and 
costs for acquiring new technology increases through owners’ monopoly positions. At 
the same time, IPRs may increase incentives for innovation and therefore flows of new 
technology. Furthermore, patenting requires that the applicant reveals basic information 
about the invention, which becomes public. The academic and (heated) political debates 
on the TRIPS (Trade related aspects of intellectual property rights) agreement in the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) reflect these tensions.1 
 
Our framework takes the IPR institutions as given and focuses on their functioning as a 
conduit. A patent in a specific country protects the inventor, both from imitators 
producing in that country and from outside imitators selling there. To get a wider 
geographical protection, the inventor has to apply for patent equivalents, i.e. parallel 
patents for the invention in several countries. Accordingly, patent protection increases 
with the number of patent equivalents, i.e. with the size of the patent family. But to 
apply for patents in many countries is costly. Therefore, the decision to apply for patent 
protection in a given country reflects a tradeoff between gains and costs. With this 
approach, international patenting signals that the IPR owners expect their technology to 
have a market abroad and therefore diffusion of the patented technology to these 
markets. 
 
Recent decades have seen a trend towards strengthening and harmonization of patent 
institutions across nations and regions. At the same time, international patenting has 
been increasing in importance. In 2010, more than 40 percent of all patent applications 
in the world’s patent offices were from non-residents (WIPO 2011). But still, most 
patents are patented in only one or just a few countries. 
 
The purpose of this study is to analyze the international patenting strategy of small firms 
and inventors. A theoretical model derived from Eaton and Kortum (1996) is set up to 
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analyze the patentees’ choice to patent in foreign countries. The model predicts that the 
probability of patenting in another country is related to characteristics of the invention 
and indicators of the market where patent protection is applied for, like market size, 
growth rate and patenting costs. In the empirical analysis, we use a detailed database on 
patents owned by small Swedish firms and inventors. The database contains information 
on patent equivalents, several patent value indicators and characteristics of the firms and 
the inventors. This database is complemented with host country characteristics. The 
database is therefore appropriate for microeconometric analysis. We find that the results 
in the empirical estimations are in accordance with the model’s predictions. Whereas 
most earlier studies have used aggregated patent data to infer about international 
patenting, in this study we make use of micro level data at the patent and at the country 
level. This is the main contribution of the study. 
 
Our topic is important. First, as noted, international patenting provides one (of several) 
channel for international technology diffusion. By investigating determinants of 
international patenting, determinants of technology diffusion may also be revealed. 
Second, with international heterogeneity in IPR institutions, their impacts can be 
evaluated.    
 
The paper is organized as follows. Some trends in international patenting are discussed 
in section 2. In section 3, the database and some statistical tests are presented. In section 
4, we set up a theoretical model for international patenting. Econometric methodology 
and hypotheses for explanatory variables are discussed in section 5. Section 6 presents 
our empirical results and the final section draws several conclusions.  
 
2. International patenting 
IPR protection has traditionally been the domain of nation states. But international 
treaties ─ from the Paris convention in 1883 to the TRIPS in 1995 and subsequent 
agreements ─ have dictated convergence in IPR institutions. International patentees are 
guaranteed national treatment by increasingly similar IPR institutions across the world.2 
Thus, international patenting is facilitated by institutional reforms. 
 
Patents in specific countries can be filed directly with national patent offices. For 
example, in Sweden patents are filed with the Swedish Patent and Registration Office 
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(PRV). Once a patent is filed with any patent office, the inventor must within a year file 
patents with other offices if he wished to expand the patent right to other countries (the 
priority year). In Europe, a European patent can be filed with the European Patent 
Office (EPO). The invention will then be protected in as many members of EPO (40 
countries) as desired. If patents are desired in many countries worldwide, the inventor 
can make an international PCT-application either with the national patent office, EPO or 
the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).3 This can lead to a patent 
covering a total 148 countries (as of 2013). 
 
Comparing the three large patenting areas (called the Triad), the EPO-system is much 
more fragmented than the U.S. and Japanese systems (van Pottelsberghe 2009, 2010; 
van Pottelsberghe and Francois 2009). The costs for EPO-patents are considerably 
higher, since patents have to be validated and subsequently renewed in each member 
state where patent protection is sought.4 Furthermore, there is no unitary European 
litigation court. 
 
Figure 1. Share of non-resident patents 
Source: WIPO (2011). 
 
 4 
International patenting has increased in importance in recent years. For the world 
economy, the number of patent families ─ i.e. the number of patented inventions, 
including their international patent equivalents ─ has increased by around 80 percent 
from 1990 to 2006 (WIPO 2011).  
 
Figure 1 shows developments of the share of non-resident patent applications for all 
countries, and for the U.S. and Japan. For EPO, the figure graphs the U.S and Japanese 
share of patent applications (since the number of countries who are members of EPO 
has changed over time). Figure 1 indicates that non-residents slowly have increased 
their share of patenting in major economies (except for U.S. and Japanese patentees in 
the EPO). Since the number of patent families has increased, the increasing shares of 
non-resident patent applications clearly suggest international patenting has grown in 
importance. 
 
Figure 2 Shares of foreign patents relative to domestic patents by country of origin 
of patentees 
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While Figure 1 shows share of non-resident patents, Figure 2 illustrates foreign patents 
from 1997 to 2011 as a ratio of domestic patents by the country of origin of patentees. 
Since a domestic patent may have several patent equivalents abroad, this ratio can be 
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higher than 1. Foreign patents outnumber domestic patents, especially for countries with 
limited domestic markets. The graph indicates that foreign patenting has become more 
attractive for patent owners in most countries in the figure except from Japan and the 
U.S.5 
 
The trends above indicate that international patenting is of great importance and it has 
received increasing attention in the research literature. Penrose (1951) is an early 
overview of the international patent system. Slama (1981) pioneers analyses of 
international patenting with the use of the traditional gravity model, finding that market 
size (positively) and distance (negatively) influence bilateral international patent 
patterns. Evenson (1984) discusses trends in international patenting, showing there are 
comparative advantage patterns in innovation similar to the patterns observed in 
countries’ production. Thus, industrial knowledge production is concentrated in 
countries according to their comparative advantages and international patenting reflects 
international trade patterns. Harhoff et al. (2009) use a gravity model framework to 
evaluate patent policies and to explore determinants of international patenting. We use a 
similar approach, albeit with a microeconomic structure, to investigate patent holders’ 
decisions to patent internationally. Chan (2010) uses a limited dataset on nine 
agricultural biotechnology firms to analyze the probability of international patent 
applications in seven countries. Chan’s results indicate that invention quality plays an 
important role in firms’ decision to patent abroad in addition to business climate and 
patent enforcement across countries.  
 
Eaton and Kortum (1996 and 1999) and McCalman (2005) use international patenting 
and international copyrights to make inferences about international technology diffusion 
(McCalman for the case of Hollywood movies). Eaton and Kortum (1996) hypothesize 
that technology diffusion contributes to economic growth and that international 
patenting indicates such diffusion. They model and estimate a general equilibrium 
growth model for many countries, based on innovation and diffusion. Eaton and Kortum 
(1999) construct a related model where R&D efforts are endogenized. McCalman 
(2001) also uses the Eaton and Kortum framework to investigate the distribution of 
rents from patenting between countries as a function of IPR institutional design. More 
recently, Branstetter et al. (2006) investigate technology transfers within U.S. 
multinationals as a function of changes in other countries’ IPR regimes.   
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From another perspective, international patenting has been used as an indicator of the 
value of the patented invention. Putnam (1996) and Lanjouw, Pakes and Putnam (1996) 
are pioneering contributions. Several studies have found that the size of the patent 
family is positively related to patent or firm value (Schmoch et al. 1988; Lanjouw and 
Schankerman 2001; Harhoff, Scherer and Vopel 2002). Only those inventions with 
sufficiently high value will be patented abroad, given the high costs in many countries 
to file and renew the patents. Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004) construct an index of 
patent quality based on multiple indicators of which the size of the patent family is one.  
Below we analyze international patenting as a function of other patent quality 
indicators.6 
 
Our hypothesis is that inventions with high values tend to be patented more often 
internationally than inventions with low values. We therefore relate international 
patenting to indicators of patent quality. We rely on two main indicators. These are 
patent renewal data and patent citations data. Patent renewal data has been used 
extensively as an indicator of the private value of patent protection. In most countries 
patents have to be renewed periodically, and a renewal fee has to be paid, in order to 
keep the patent in force. If the value of patent protection deteriorates and when patent 
renewal fees increase over time, more valuable patents are renewed for longer periods 
than less valuable patents. Pakes and Schankerman (1984), Schankerman and Pakes 
(1986), Pakes (1986), Pakes and Simpson (1989) and Schankerman (1998) are main 
contributions in this research tradition. They all estimate patent value distributions on 
the basis of this hypothesis. We use a simple patent renewal indicator as a value 
indicator for patents and relate it to international patenting.  
 
Also citations to previous patents in patent documents are used as indicator of the 
quality of the patented invention. Backward citations (i.e. cited patents in patent 
documents) have been used to track the knowledge base for the patented invention. 
Forward citations are therefore used as indicator for whether the patented invention has 
opened windows of opportunities in subsequent research. Important contributions in this 
research tradition are collected in Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2002). A main conclusion is 
that forward citations signal higher private value of patents. This is also the conclusion 
in Hall et al. (2005) who find that patent citations are positively correlated with firms’ 
 7 
market values. Harhoff et al. (1999) find similar evidence based on a survey about the 
value of a sample of patents.7 Serrano (2010) find evidence that frequently cited patents 
are more likely to be traded commercially (and renewed). 
 
We also use a dichotomous indicator for whether the patented invention has been 
commercialized. This reflects a potential direct quality indicator of the patent since it 
has proved worth market launch.8  
 
The growing literature on patent value indicators has been surveyed by van Zeebroeck 
(2011) and van Zeebroeck and van Pottelsberghe (2011). 
 
3. Database and descriptive statistics 
We use a detailed data set on patents granted to small firms (less than 1000 employees) 
and individual inventors. The data set is based on a survey conducted in 2003−04 on 
Swedish patents granted in 1998. In that year, 1,082 patents were granted to Swedish 
small firms and individuals.9 Information about the inventors, applying firms and their 
addresses as well as filing dates for each patent, was collected from the Swedish Patent 
and Registration Office (PRV). Thereafter, a questionnaire was sent out to the inventors 
of the patents. 867 (out of 1,082) inventors completed and returned the questionnaire, 
i.e. the response rate was 80 percent. This attrition is not systematic with respect to IPC-
classes or geographical regions.10  
 
The questionnaire asked the inventors about the type of work place where the invention 
was created, if-when-and-how the invention had been commercialized, the profitability 
of the commercialization and miscellaneous information about characteristics of the 
inventors. The data set was later complemented with data on patent renewal, patent 
equivalents, forward citations and filing routes from the Espacenet (2010) website. 
Thus, the database includes information on several patent value indicators. 
 
Table 1. Distribution of the number of patent equivalents in the database. 
 Number of patent equivalents 
Total 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11-15 
16- 
20 
21-
24 
Number of 
observations 
(patents) 
533 80 43 36 27 27 23 20 14 13 8 31 10 2 867 
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The 867 patents in the database have together 1,733 patent equivalents abroad, i.e. on 
average around two equivalents per patent. The frequency distribution of patent 
equivalents is shown in Table 1. Only 334 (39 percent) out of the 867 patents have any 
equivalents. Given that a Swedish patent has any equivalents, the average number of 
equivalents per patent is 5.2. The maximum number of equivalents for a given patent is 
24. 
 
There are in total patent equivalents in 35 different countries in the data set. The 
frequency for each country is shown in Appendix A, Table A1. There were 224 
equivalents in the U.S. and 141 in Japan, as well as 217 EPO-patents. EPO-patents must 
be validated in individual member countries. The EPO-patents resulted in 1,104 
individual patents in the EPO member countries, i.e. on average 5.1 individual patents 
per EPO-patent.11 Only 30 equivalents were filed directly at the national patent offices 
in the EPO area without filing an EPO-patent first. The EPO-patents in our database are 
filed most frequently in Germany, Great Britain and France – the large EPO countries. 
Thus, patent equivalents are not distributed randomly across the countries.12 Van 
Zeebroeck and van Pottelsberghe (2011) have shown that there is a strong positive 
correlation between market size and the probability that an EPO-patent will be validated 
in a country. The skewed country distribution of patents above indicates that country 
characteristics are important for international patenting. 
 
Turning to the filing routes, only eight out of 867 patents were first filed abroad – all of 
these in the U.S. No patent was first filed with EPO or WIPO and thereafter in Sweden. 
This pattern contrasts markedly to the filing routes of Swedish multinationals. The 
explanation may be polygenetic, ranging from the fact that the owners in our database 
are individuals and small firms to the fact that the data cover patent filings in the 1990s 
when it was still common to first file the patent in the home country. However, it is 
noteworthy that PCT-applications are very frequent in the database. 269 out of 334 
patents (80 percent) with foreign equivalents used PCT-applications. PCT-applications 
are even more dominant for EPO-patents (194 out of 217, or 89 percent) and for US 
patents (188 out of 224 patents, or 84 percent). 
 
Table 2 shows partial relationships between the number of patent equivalents and firm 
sizes, patent renewal, forward citations and the commercialization decision. Firms have 
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considerably more patent equivalents than individual inventors. For example, 57 percent 
of the medium sized firms had at least one equivalent, compared to 28 percent of the 
individual inventors. The differences in patent equivalents across firm groups are 
significant, using a chi-square test. However, there is no uniform relationship between 
firm size and equivalents. Micro companies have as many equivalents as small firms. 
 
Table 2. Patent equivalents across firm groups, patent renewals, forward citations 
and commercialization, No. of patents and percent. 
Categories 
Patent equivalents abroad No. of 
patents per 
category 
Average No. 
of equivalents 
Chi-
square 
test Yes No 
Medium-sized firms  
     (101–1 000 employees) 
66 
(57%) 
50 
(43%) 
116 2.54 
40.6 *** 
Small firms  
     (11–100 employees) 
87 
(43%) 
114 
(57%) 
201 2.10 
Micro companies  
     (2–10 employees) 
66 
(46%) 
76 
(54%) 
142 2.44 
Individual inventors  
     (no employees) 
115 
(28%) 
293 
(72%) 
408 1.64 
 
Alive in 2004 
Yes 247 
(51%) 
235 
(49%) 
482 3.09 
74.2 *** 
No 87 
(23%) 
298 
(77%) 
385 0.63 
 
Forward citations 
Yes 256 
(73%) 
94 
(27%) 
350 4.00 327.5 
*** No 63 
(12%) 
454 
(88%) 
517 0.64 
 
Commercialization 
Yes 251 
(48%) 
275 
(52%) 
526 
 
2.62 
47.7 *** 
No 83 
(24%) 
258 
(76%) 
341 1.04 
 
Total number of patents 334 
(39%) 
533 
(61%) 
867 2.00  
Note: ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%-, 5%- and 10%-level, respectively. 
 
In line with the literature cited above, we expect that valuable inventions will be more 
frequently patented abroad than less valuable ones, since patenting is costly. Therefore, 
we expect international patenting to correlate with variables such as patent renewal, 
forward citations and commercialization, all of which are related to the private or social 
value of patents (see section 2).  
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As discussed in section 2, the literature on patent renewal hypothesizes that renewal 
signals commercial value of a patent..13 Patents which had equivalents were 
considerably more likely to still be renewed in 2004 (alive) than those without: 51 
percent of the patents that were still valid in 2004 had equivalents, but only 23 percent 
of the expired patents. 
 
The positive relationship is even stronger between patent equivalents and forward 
citations. Patents with citations had on average 4.0 equivalents, compared to 0.64 for 
patents without citations. 73 percent of the cited patents had equivalents, compared to 
only 12 percent for the non-cited. Forward citations are used as a measure on the social 
value of patents. One explanation for this is that patents that are cited by subsequent 
patents may be considered to be basic inventions which are useful for subsequent 
development of new knowledge. However, there may also be other reasons why this 
correlation is so high. Citations are most often added by independent patent examiners 
in the patent offices. When a Swedish patent has equivalents abroad it may be much 
more visible for patent examiners. This will increase the probability that the patent is 
cited, even if the citations do not signal higher values for the cited patent. 
 
Finally, commercialized patents have more frequent patent equivalents than non-
commercialized ones. The commercialization decision should reflect a higher private 
value. 48 percent of the commercialized patents have equivalents, compared to 23 
percent of the non-commercialized ones. The chi-square tests categorically reject 
independence between commercialization and equivalents. 
 
4. A model set-up for international patenting 
We use a simple model of international patenting, where the decision to patent in a 
foreign country depends on country characteristics and the quality of the patented 
innovation. Our model is a simplified and modified version of Eaton and Kortum 
(1996). Their model is a fully fledged international general equilibrium growth model in 
which international patenting plays an important role. In Eaton and Kortum’s model, 
R&D improves on the quality of input factors used in production processes domestically 
and in other countries. The degree to which an invention is used in other countries’ 
production processes depends on the probabilistic size of each invention. If the 
invention is used in a country’s production process, the owner of the invention sells the 
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technology monopolistically to the producer in that country. The owner of the invention 
faces a risk of imitation, which depends on whether or not the invention is patented. 
Eaton and Kortum (1996) develop the steady state growth paths in the model. This 
steady state is characterized by similar growth rates in all countries, but lower 
productivity in countries with low investments in R&D and little use of other countries’ 
technologies. The incentives to do R&D and patent internationally depend on market 
size, protection of IPRs and a set of other parameters.  
 
Given the scope of this paper, our set-up is less ambitious and meant to provide a rough 
microeconomic theory basis for our empirical specification of international patenting. 
Our available data are micro data that allows us to focus on and formulate patent 
owners’ choice about where to patent.  
 
The model is a quality ladder model of innovation à la Grossman and Helpman (1991a). 
Output in each country is produced with the help of intermediates, according to a 
constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas production function:  
( ) vvv dXZY ∫=
1
0
lnln       )1  
where Y denotes production, Xv the quantity of intermediate v and Zv its quality. 
 
Improvements in the quality of intermediates are the result of R&D and inventions. An 
invention improves on the quality of an intermediate such that the new generation of the 
intermediate Z’v relates to the previous generation, Zv according to: 
v
q ZeZ =v'       
The size or quality of the invention, q, is random so that the patenting decision is 
heterogeneous. Inventions that are large will be patented widely; whereas small 
inventions will only be patented in the home country of the owner. 
 
Intermediates are produced under a simple production technology where one hour work 
is needed to produce one unit. The final good is a numeraire, so given a wage level, w, 
the price charged by a firm producing the intermediate with the highest available 
quality, eq, is given by equation 2. This equation implies limit pricing where the leading 
firm in the market marginally undercuts the optimal price charged by the firm with the 
next highest quality (Bertrand pricing). The incumbent firm’s price equals w after the 
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leader has entered the market. The produced quantity for a firm producing the 
intermediate v depends on the demand function derived from equation 1. This demand 
function is given by equation 3.  
we
Y
p
YX
wep
v
v
q
v
v
q
v
==
=
       3)
       )2
 
Profits from an invention of size q are therefore equal to: 
( )Ye
we
Yw
we
wYewXXp v
vv
v
q
qq
q
vvv
−−=−=−= 1       )4 vπ  
Equation 4 relates profitability of innovations to market size. This proves to be an 
important empirical regularity.14  
 
A patent reduces the probability that the invention will be imitated in any period during 
the lifetime of the patent, from k to zero. For simplicity we assume that patents last 
forever,15 and we also assume that if a patent is imitated, the profits for the inventor are 
reduced to zero. The discounted values of an unpatented and patented invention of 
quality q in country j are therefore: 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )∫
∫
∞
−−
∞
+−−
−=
−=
0
0
1       )6
1      )5
dseeYeqV
dseeYeq V
rssg
j
qpatent
j
skrsg
j
qnopatent
j
j
j
 
Above, r denotes the discount rate and g the growth rate in the economy. The value of 
patenting is the difference V(q)jpatent-V(q)jnopatent. The inventor will seek patent protection 
if this difference exceeds the cost of patenting in country j, Cj. Therefore the equality  
( ) ( ) jnopatentjpatentj CqVqV =− **        7)  
determines the threshold quality level q* such that innovations of higher quality are 
patented and those with lower qualities are not. Therefore the threshold value qj* for a 
patent to be patented in country j is given in equation 8. The derivation of it is presented 
in Appendix C.  
( )( )







 −+−
−−=
kY
gkrgrC
q
j
jjj
j 1ln*       8)
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It is evident from equation 8 that the threshold value qj depends on patent costs, market 
size, interest rate, the growth rate and the risk of being imitated without patenting. The 
higher the threshold value the lower is the probability that an invention is patented in 
the particular market.  
 
Let the size of an invention depend on a vector of patent specific characteristics, λi, and 
the realization of a random variable Q drawn from a probability distribution, so that 
P(Q<q) = F(q).16 We formulate the size of an invention i as the product of realizations 
of Q and patent specific characteristics captured by the vector λi with coefficient vector 
β, qij = qλiβ. For patenting to occur it must be that, qij>0, which imposes parameter 
restrictions for the vector λiβ. The threshold realization of Q for a patent i to be patented 
in country j is:   
9) 
( )( )







 −+−
−





−=
kY
gkrgrC
q
j
j
ij 1ln
1*
βλ i
  
The following results are easily derived: 
Lemma   
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ij
j
ij
j
ij
j
ij
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ij
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dq
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* dq
dY
* dq
dC
* dq
sign
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dq
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λ
 
The first of these results means that the impact of patent characteristics on the threshold 
realization of Q for patenting is the negative of the parameter β (to be estimated). Thus 
patent characteristics that increase the value of a patent lower the threshold value 
realization of Q for patenting. Patent characteristics that reduce patent value increase the 
threshold. Accordingly, the higher the quality of the patent, the higher is the probability 
that the invention is patented in any country. The second results imply that the higher 
the patenting costs, the higher the threshold value for the quality of an invention to be 
patented. Therefore, the higher the patenting costs in a country, the lower the probability 
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that an invention will be patented in that country. The third result means that the larger 
the GDP of a country the lower the threshold value for the quality of an invention to be 
patented. Therefore, the probability that an invention will be patented will be increasing 
with the market size of a given country. The fourth and fifth results are similar for 
growth in total GDP and risk of imitation in the absence of patenting.   
 
Generally, the quality of patented inventions has unknown distributions. The exact 
functional form of the probability to patent is therefore not known. We approximate the 
binary choice (to patent or not) as: 



 ≥
=
∗
   otherwise 0
  if   1
       10) ijijij
qq
 PQ
 
Above, PQij denotes whether a patent of quality q is patented in country j or not. The 
probability that the owner of a patent i seeks protection in a country j can be written as: 
 
 ( ) ( )βα ijij fPQP λT +==1      11)  
 
In equation 11, T denotes a vector of characteristics of the country in which patent 
protection is applied for, while λ denotes the vector of characteristics of the patented 
invention. 
 
5. Econometric method and explanatory variables 
 
Database 
Our empirical strategy is to estimate variants of the above model. We use the patent 
dataset described in section 3. The uniqueness of our dataset is that it includes several 
individual patent value indicators, host country variables as well as patent-country 
variables corresponding to the explanatory factors in the theoretical model. This makes 
the dataset appropriate to estimate the implied relationships and test the hypotheses of 
the theoretical model. In our dataset, we have information on whether a patent has been 
granted in any of 35 countries (see Appendix A, Table A1). On the basis of this 
information, we create an expanded dataset consisting of 867*34 = 29,478 
observations.17 The unit of observation in this dataset is therefore the existence of a 
patent equivalent for patent i in country j.  
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Methodology 
The dependent binary variable is whether the owner has patent protection for patent i in 
country j. International patent protection comes in addition to domestic (Swedish) patent 
protection, since the data base is constructed on the basis of the 1998 cohort of granted 
Swedish patents. Accordingly, we will use a model with a binary dependent variable to 
estimate how various explanatory variables are related to the patent protection in 
individual countries. The choice is the probit model.  
 
Our dataset is two dimensional, along the patent dimension (i.e. different patents are 
protected in a given country) and the country dimension (one patent can be protected in 
different countries). The dataset therefore has panel data characteristics, although not in 
the standard cross observation over time dimensions. We therefore rely on a random 
effects probit model as our main empirical model, since a fixed effects model faces the 
incidental parameter problem, see e.g. Heckman (1981). In our set-up, the unobserved 
heterogeneity is on the patent-country level. This is formulated by assuming that the 
error term consists of two elements, eij = εi+uij, where εi captures elements that are 
country invariant and patent specific. The remaining noise is captured by uij.  
 
Variables derived from the model 
For the host country, GDP (in 1995) reflects market size and GROWTH captures GDP 
growth (in the period from 1990 to 2000).18 The expected influence on the probability 
for a patent equivalent is positive and follows directly from our theoretical model (Y and 
g). GDP and GROWTH are collected from the World Development Indicators (World 
Bank 2011). 
 
We have some proxies linked to the risk of imitation (k) in the model. All of these have 
an expected positive effect on patent equivalents: 
• RDGDP. R&D as percent of GDP in the host country should reflect an increased 
probability of being imitated (from World Development Indicators).19 
• GDPCAP. GDP per capita (in 1995) may reflect the technological level of the 
host country and a higher probability of being imitated (from World 
Development Indicators).20 
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• NRCA. We constructed a normalized version of the well-known revealed 
technological advantage (NRCA), which varies between −1 and 1 for each 
country for each patent class. NRCA is therefore expected to indicate potential 
competition and imitation of the patent in question. NRCA is patent (class) and 
country specific. We gathered the data from the NBER patent data base (Hall, 
Jaffe and Trajtenberg 2002; NBER 2006). The formula is given in Appendix D.  
 
In line with the theory, we include total patent costs in the host country, COST.  
However, there is no patent cost index for all countries, inasmuch as the costs of 
patenting depend on several components, e.g. the filing costs. Very often (official) 
translation of the patent documents is required. If so, this adds a new cost component. 
Patentees are known to routinely use patent agencies for handling national patent offices 
which adds costs that can vary. Furthermore, annual renewal costs are added if the 
patent is granted. In most countries such renewal costs are low but increase as the patent 
matures. In Europe, patent protection can be applied in many countries via EPO. If so, 
the patent still needs to be validated and subsequently renewed in each of member 
countries individually. But patents in Europe can also be obtained through patent 
applications to each of the individual countries directly. We have chosen to use the 
patent costs from the survey by Helfgott (1993), even though Helfgott’s cost data 
unfortunately covers only 20 of our 34 countries (see Table A1).21 We report separate 
estimation results when COST is included. 
 
Patent institutions vary in quality. Some countries provide strong IPRs while others are 
slack. We use the index described in Ginarte and Park (1997) and updated in Park 
(2008). This index is an average of indicators for patent coverage, membership in 
international treaties, duration of protection, enforcement mechanisms and restrictions. 
The database consists of observations for several years. We include countries’ score in 
1995 (PARK95). The index is designed to measure the strength of patent protection, not 
the (social) quality of patent systems.22 We also include a dummy variable for EPO-
membership.  
 
Patent value indicators 
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The patent value indicators are taken from the database. The expected positive 
relationship to equivalents was discussed in section 3. Higher private value implies a 
higher probability of patenting the invention in any market. 
 
• ALIVE is a dummy variable for whether the Swedish patent was still valid in 
2004. 
• COM is a dummy variable for whether the invention was commercialized. 
• CIT measures the number of forward citations per five-year period. Since 
citation practices differ across IPC-classes, CIT is weighted by the number of 
citations per IPC-class. 
 
Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2002) argue that patents that are cited across many 
technology fields are general and may have particularly wide applications for further 
technological developments. Maurseth (2005) argues that citations within technology 
classes signal competition and rival inventions to the cited patent, while citations across 
technology classes signal the higher private and social value of the patented invention. 
Therefore, we discriminate between intra-technology and inter-technology patent 
citations with the two variables CITwi and CITbe in most estimations. 
 
We have reasons to believe that our data is characterized by endogeneity problems. If a 
patent proves valuable, it will probably have both a higher probability of 
commercialization, be renewed for longer periods, receive more forward citations and 
have a higher probability of being granted patent equivalents (see e.g. Svensson 2012). 
It is extremely difficult to tell in which direction causality runs between our right-hand 
value indicators and patent equivalents. Therefore, we include the patent value 
indicators successively in separate estimations and interpret the results with caution. 
 
Other variables 
Due to credit constraints, larger firms should have a higher propensity to apply for 
patent equivalents (see Table 2). Firm sizes are included in the estimations as dummy 
variables: MED, SMALL and MICRO. The reference group is inventors with no 
employees. 
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Distance between Sweden and the host country, DIST, should be included for two 
reasons. First, trade is known to depend negatively on distance. Therefore the value of 
patenting will be lower in distant countries (fewer goods are exported there). But it may 
also be the case that distance indicates higher (non-formal) costs of patenting in the 
country. The inventor may have to travel there. Also languages and cultures may well 
be more different and strange across long distances.  
 
EXPSH is measured as Sweden’s export share with the country in question.23 We expect 
a high Swedish export share to identify an important market for Swedish producers, and 
thus higher propensities to patent in these countries.  
 
Since patenting is known to vary much between industries and technology classes 
(Levin et al. 1987), we use additive dummies for 30 different industry classes 
designated by Breschi, Lissoni and Malerba (2004). These are based on the IPC 
technology class system. A patent may belong to several different IPC-classes. 
However, it is not possible to determine the main IPC-class, since the classes are listed 
in alphabetic order for each patent in Espacenet (2010). Therefore, a patent in our 
database may belong to as many as four different industry classes. Consequently, the 30 
industry dummies are not mutually exclusive. 
  
YEAR represents the application year of the Swedish patent. The data at hand is for the 
cohort of patents granted in 1998. Later application dates therefore indicate a relatively 
shorter time for consideration at the patent office. One interpretation is that patents 
under consideration for longer periods are more minor and dubious than patents granted 
after a short period. If this is the case, patents that were applied for early would have 
lower private values. Another interpretation is that long consideration reflects the 
complexity of the invention. 24 
 
All explanatory variables, basic statistics and their expected impact on patent 
equivalents are described in Appendix A, Table A2.  
 
6. Results  
Tables 3 through 5 present the empirical results estimated by the random effects probit 
model. The dependent binary variable is whether the owner has patent protection for 
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patent i in country j.25 The COST variable is excluded in Tables 3 and 4 due to data 
constraints, but is included in Table 5.  
 
The parameter ρ (in the end of each table) is the proportion of the total variance 
contributed by the panel-level variance component in the dataset. If ρ is zero, the panel-
level variance component is unimportant, and the panel level estimator is not different 
from the pooled estimator (StataCorp 2007). The estimated values of ρ are between ⅔ 
and ¾ and highly significant. This underlines the importance of taking due care of the 
panel data characteristics in the dataset. 
 
Table 3. Results of estimations, random effects probit model. 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 
GDP 0.67*** 
(0.021) 
0.67*** 
(0.021) 
0.67*** 
(0.021) 
0.67*** 
(0.021) 
0.67*** 
(0.021) 
0.67*** 
(0.021) 
GROWTH 0.13*** 
(0.018) 
0.13*** 
 (0.018) 
0.13*** 
(0.018) 
0.13*** 
(0.018) 
0.13*** 
(0.018) 
013.*** 
(0.018) 
RDGDP 0.13*** 
(0.033) 
0.13*** 
(0.033) 
0.13*** 
(0.033) 
0.13*** 
(0.033) 
0.13*** 
(0.033) 
0.13*** 
(0.033) 
GDPCAP 0.33*** 
(0.045) 
0.33*** 
(0.045) 
0.33***  
(0.045) 
0.33*** 
(0.045) 
0.33*** 
(0.045) 
0.33*** 
(0.045) 
NRCA 0.48*** 
(0.067) 
0.48*** 
(0.067) 
0.48*** 
(0.067) 
0.48*** 
(0.067) 
0.48*** 
(0.067) 
0.48*** 
(0.067) 
COM  1.00*** 
(0.145) 
   0.68*** 
(0.133) 
ALIVE   1.28*** 
(0.140) 
  1.03*** 
(0.133) 
CIT    0.41*** 
(0.040) 
  
CITwi     0.35*** 
(0.040) 
0.30*** 
(0.036) 
CITbe     0.15** 
(0.030) 
0.13** 
(0.026) 
MED 0.85*** 
(0.203) 
0.71*** 
(0.198) 
0.49*** 
(0.192) 
0.68** 
(0.196) 
0.64*** 
(0.192) 
0.28 
(0.179) 
SMALL 0.49*** 
(0.173) 
0.33** 
(0.171) 
0.26 
(0.165) 
0.36 
(0.168) 
0.35** 
(0.167) 
0.06 
(0.155) 
MICRO 0.69*** 
(0.189) 
0.48*** 
(0.186) 
0.50*** 
(0.179) 
0.60** 
(0.182) 
0.55*** 
(0.180) 
0.28* 
(0.167) 
DIST −0.28*** 
(0.030) 
−0.27*** 
(0.030) 
−0.27*** 
(0.030) 
−0.28*** 
(0.030) 
−0.28*** 
(0.030) 
−0.27*** 
(0.030) 
EPOmemb 0.44*** 
(0.051) 
0.44*** 
(0.051) 
0.44*** 
(0.051) 
0.44*** 
(0.051) 
0.44*** 
(0.051) 
0.44*** 
(0.051) 
YEAR 0.076* 
(0.041) 
0.080** 
(0.040) 
0.063 
(0.039 
0.07* 
(0.040) 
0.087** 
(0.040) 
0.08** 
(0.037) 
ρ 0.71*** 
(0.019) 
0.69*** 
(0.020) 
0.67*** 
(0.021) 
0.68*** 
(0.021) 
0.70*** 
(0.021) 
0.62*** 
(0.023) 
n 29,478 29,478 29,478 29,478 29,478 29,478 
Note: The dependent variable is the existence of patent equivalent of patent i in country j. Std. errors in 
parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%-, 5%- and 10%-level, respectively. All 
estimations include 30 industry dummies (not reported). 
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The first column in Table 3 reports results when only the main country characteristics, 
NRCA, distance, firm size, YEAR, EPO membership dummy and industry dummies are 
included. The results lend support to our main hypotheses from the modeling exercise 
above. GDP, GROWTH, RDGDP, GDPCAP and NRCA all influence patenting abroad, 
significantly and with the expected signs for the parameters. The results from RDGDP 
and NRCA indicate that inventors tend to patent more in countries that have 
technological strengths; generally (RDGDP) or specifically (NRCA) in the relevant 
technology field. Also, the parameters of the control variables DIST and EPOmemb as 
well as the firm size dummies are significant, and these have the expected signs. YEAR 
has a positive and (weakly) significant coefficient. 
 
Columns 2, 3 and 4 successively introduce patent value indicators. COM, ALIVE and 
CIT are all strongly positively and significantly correlated with the probability of 
equivalents. These results hold also when they are included together in column 6. In 
fact, the estimated parameters are not heavily affected by simultaneously including the 
three variables. We believe that these results reflect higher values of commercialized, 
renewed and cited patents. In column 5 and 6 we discriminate between citations 
between IPC-classes and within IPC-classers. The results indicate that within citations 
have a higher influence on patent equivalents than do citations between IPC-classes. 
This may reflect higher imitation risk from citing patents that are technologically close 
to the cited patent than from technologically distant citing patents. 
 
Table 4 includes EXPSH and PARK95 as additional explanatory variables. Even if 
gravity variables (GDP and DIST) are included in our equations, high trade shares may 
have additional explanatory power. The estimated results indicate that this is the case. 
Sweden’s export share to her trading partners has significant positive effects on Swedish 
patenting in these countries. Note that the parameters of the gravity variables (GDP and 
DIST) lose size and significance due to inclusion of EXPSH, but they remain highly 
significant. PARK95 has a positive and highly significant coefficient, indicating that 
strength of IPRs is important for international patenting. In the context of technology 
diffusion, this result indicates that improved IPRs facilitate technology diffusion (which 
may in part or fully compensate for reduced imitation rates). 
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Table 4. Results of estimations, random effects probit model, with trade 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 
GDP 0.54*** 
(0.032) 
0.54*** 
(0.032) 
0.54*** 
(0.032) 
0.54*** 
(0.032) 
0.54*** 
(0.032) 
0.54*** 
(0.032) 
GROWTH 0.10*** 
(0.020) 
0.10*** 
 (0.020) 
0.10*** 
(0.020) 
0.10*** 
(0.020) 
0.10*** 
(0.020) 
0.10*** 
(0.020)) 
RDGDP 0.11*** 
(0.035) 
0.11*** 
(0.035) 
0.11*** 
(0.035) 
0.11*** 
(0.035) 
0.11*** 
(0.035) 
0.11*** 
(0.035) 
GDPCAP 0.07 
(0.074) 
0.07 
(0.074) 
0.07  
(0.074) 
0.07 
(0.074) 
0.07 
(0.074) 
0.07 
(0.074) 
NRCA 0.48*** 
(0.068) 
0.48*** 
(0.068) 
0.48*** 
(0.068) 
0.48*** 
(0.068) 
0.48*** 
(0.068) 
0.48*** 
(0.068) 
COM  1.03*** 
(0.149) 
   0.69*** 
(0.136) 
ALIVE   1.31*** 
(0.144) 
  1.05*** 
(0.136) 
CIT    0.42*** 
(0.042) 
  
CITwi     0.36*** 
(0.041) 
0.31*** 
(0.037) 
CITbe     0.15*** 
(0.030) 
0.13*** 
(0.027) 
MED 0.89*** 
(0.208) 
0.73*** 
(0.204) 
0.51*** 
(0.197) 
0.70*** 
(0.201) 
0.67*** 
(0.198) 
0.30 
(0.184) 
SMALL 0.51*** 
(0.178) 
0.34** 
(0.175) 
0.27 
(0.169) 
0.37** 
(0.173) 
0.36** 
(0.170) 
0.07 
(0.159) 
MICRO 0.71*** 
(0.194) 
0.50*** 
(0.191) 
0.52*** 
(0.184) 
0.62*** 
(0.187) 
0.57*** 
(0.185) 
0.30* 
(0.172) 
DIST −0.11*** 
(0.040) 
−0.11*** 
(0.040) 
−0.11*** 
(0.040) 
−0.11*** 
(0.041) 
−0.11*** 
(0.041) 
−0.11*** 
(0.041) 
EXPSH 5.66*** 
(0.982) 
5.67*** 
(0.982) 
5.66*** 
(0.981) 
5.72*** 
(0.984) 
5.70*** 
(0.984) 
5.70*** 
(0.983) 
PARK95 0.20*** 
(0.068) 
0.20*** 
(0.068) 
0.20*** 
(0.068) 
0.20*** 
(0.068) 
0.20*** 
(0.068) 
0.20*** 
(0.068) 
EPOmemb 0.43*** 
(0.053) 
0.43*** 
(0.053) 
0.43*** 
(0.054) 
0.43*** 
(0.054) 
0.43*** 
(0.054) 
0.43*** 
(0.054) 
YEAR 0.08* 
(0.042) 
0.08* 
(0.041) 
0.06 
(0.40) 
0.08* 
(0.041) 
0.09** 
(0.040) 
0.08** 
(0.038) 
ρ 0.72*** 
(0.019) 
0.70*** 
(0.020) 
0.68*** 
(0.021) 
0.69*** 
(0.021) 
0.68*** 
(0.021) 
0.63*** 
(0.023) 
n 27,744 27,744 27,744 27,744 27,744 27,744 
Note: The dependent variable is the existence of patent equivalent of patent i in country j. Std. errors in 
parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%-, 5%- and 10%-level, respectively. All 
estimations include 30 industry dummies (not reported). 
 
 
In Table 5, we report similar estimations inclusive of patent costs. These results are for 
the subsample of 20 countries for which patenting costs are available, and are mainly in 
line with those presented for the larger samples. The exception is that neither GROWTH 
nor DIST is significant. Note that patent costs were not available for a series of 
transition countries with high growth rates. All the other variables enter significantly 
with the same signs, as reported above. The parameter of COST is negative and 
significant, indicating that patent policies have real important effects. 
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Table 5. Results of estimations, random effects probit model, with costs 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 
GDP 0.48*** 
(0.038) 
0.48*** 
(0.038) 
0.48*** 
(0.038) 
0.48*** 
(0.038) 
0.48*** 
(0.038) 
0.48*** 
(0.38) 
GROW 0.00 
(0.040) 
0.00 
 (0.040) 
0.00 
(0.040) 
0.00 
(0.040) 
0.00 
(0.040) 
0.00 
(0.040) 
RDGDP 0.07* 
(0.042) 
0.07* 
(0.043) 
0.07* 
(0.042) 
0.07* 
(0.043) 
0.07* 
(0.043) 
0.07* 
(0.043) 
GDPCAP 0.18 
(0.155) 
0.18 
(0.155) 
0.18  
(0.155) 
0.18 
(0.155) 
0.18 
(0.155) 
0.18 
(0.155) 
NRCA 0.61*** 
(0.078) 
0.61*** 
(0.078) 
0.61*** 
(0.078) 
0.62*** 
(0.079) 
0.62*** 
(0.079) 
0.52*** 
(0.078) 
COST −0.47*** 
(0.140) 
−0.47*** 
(0.140) 
−0.47*** 
(0.140) 
−0.47*** 
(0.140) 
−0.47*** 
(0.140) 
−0.47*** 
(0.140) 
COM.  1.02*** 
(0.152) 
   0.68*** 
(0.139) 
ALIVE   1.32*** 
(0.146) 
  1.05*** 
(0.139) 
CIT    0.43*** 
(0.042) 
  
CITwi     0.37*** 
(0.042) 
0.32*** 
(0.038) 
CITbe     0.15*** 
(0.030) 
0.13*** 
(0.028) 
MED 0.93*** 
(0.212) 
0.78*** 
(0.207) 
0.56*** 
(0.200) 
0.75*** 
(0.204) 
0.71*** 
(0.201) 
0.35* 
(0.187) 
SMALL 0.49*** 
(0.181) 
0.33* 
(0.179) 
0.26 
(0.172) 
0.36** 
(0.176) 
0.35** 
(0.174) 
0.07 
(0.163) 
MICRO 0.70*** 
(0.198) 
0.49** 
(0.194) 
0.50*** 
(0.187) 
0.60*** 
(0.190) 
0.56*** 
(0.188) 
0.28 
(0.175) 
DIST −0.07 
(0.050) 
−0.07 
(0.050) 
−0.07 
(0.050) 
−0.07 
(0.050) 
−0.07 
(0.050) 
−0.07 
(0.050) 
EXPSH 7.13*** 
(1.061) 
7.14*** 
(1.061) 
7.12*** 
(1.060) 
7.18*** 
(1.063) 
7.17*** 
(1.063) 
7.16*** 
(1.062) 
PARK95 0.51*** 
(0.118) 
0.51*** 
(0.118) 
0.51*** 
(0.117) 
0.51*** 
(0.118) 
0.51*** 
(0.118) 
0.51*** 
(0.117) 
EPOmemb 0.35*** 
(0.089) 
0.35*** 
(0.089) 
0.35*** 
(0.089) 
0.36*** 
(0.089) 
0.35*** 
(0.089) 
0.35*** 
(0.089) 
YEAR 0.07* 
(0.043) 
0.08* 
(0.041) 
0.06 
(0.040) 
0.07 
(0.042) 
0.08** 
(0.041) 
0.07* 
(0.09) 
ρ 0.73*** 
(0.019) 
0.71*** 
(0.020) 
0.69*** 
(0.021) 
0.70*** 
(0.021) 
0.69*** 
(0.021) 
0.64*** 
(0.023) 
n 17,340 17,340 17,340 17,340 17,340 17,340 
Note: The dependent variable is the existence of patent equivalent of patent i in country j. Std. errors in 
parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%-, 5%- and 10%-level, respectively. All 
estimations include 30 industry dummies (not reported). Cost coefficient and its standard deviation is 
multiplied with 1000.  
 
7. Summary and concluding remarks 
We modeled international patenting as the outcome of a strategy where gains and costs 
were traded off against one another. The model predicts that the number of patent 
equivalents depends on market size, growth, patent costs and patent specific variables. 
Our main contribution is that we have tested the model of international patenting using 
detailed patent level data with several patent value indicators. 
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Our empirical results support the predictions of the theoretical model. First, more 
valuable patents – either measured as patent renewal, commercialization or forward 
citations (both within and between technologies) – have more patent equivalents. 
Second, the country specific variables have estimates in line with expectations. Market 
size, economic growth and distance have coefficients with expected signs, and these are 
not insignificant. Also, indicators of technological rivalry in foreign markets, generally 
in terms of R&D intensity or relative specialization in the relevant patent classes 
(NRCA), stimulate international patenting. Finally, IPR policies are consequential on 
multiple levels. High patenting costs in the host country reduce patenting. The index for 
patent institutional quality influences international patenting significantly and Swedish 
patent owners patent more frequently in EPO member countries. However, our results 
are only applicable to patents owned by individuals and small firms, since the database 
was restricted to such owners. 
 
Our results are in line with – but go considerably beyond – those of Harhoff et al. 
(2009). They estimate a gravity relationship for patenting among European countries 
(and for other non-European patent applications in Europe), and find similar results for 
the aggregate number of patent equivalents between these countries. Equivalents depend 
positively on market size, and negatively on distance and costs. However, Harhoff et al. 
(2009) estimate aggregated numbers of international patents, and thus were unable to 
incorporate patent specific characteristics in the same way as we do. They conclude 
their study by acknowledging an “improvement would be to confirm these results at the 
patent level” (p. 1434).  
 
References 
 
Abrams, D.S., U. Akcigit and J. Popadak. 2013. Patent Value and Citations: Creative 
Destruction or Defensive Disruption? University of Pennsylvania Working Paper,  
http://www.sas.upenn.edu/~uakcigit/web/Research_files/AAP_NBERsi.pdf (accessed 
November 2013). 
 
Akcigit, U., M.A. Celik and J. Greenwood. 2013. Buy, Keep or Sell: Economic Growth 
and the Market for Ideas. Manuscript. 
http://www.sas.upenn.edu/~uakcigit/web/Research_files/AAP_NBERsi.pdf (accessed 
November 2013). 
 
Arora, A. and A. Gambardella. 2010. Ideas for rent: An overview of markets for 
technology. Industrial and Corporate Change 19, no. 3: 775–803.  
 24 
 
Birdsall, N., D. Rodrik, and A. Subramanian. 2005. How to help poor countries. 
Foreign Affairs 94, no. 4: 136–52. 
 
Branstetter, L.G., R. Fisman, and C. Fritz Foley. 2006. Do stronger intellectual property 
rights increase international technology transfer? Empirical evidence from U.S. firm-
level panel data. Quarterly Journal of Economics 121, no. 1: 321–49.  
 
Branstetter, L., R. Fisman, C. Fritz Foley, and K. Saggi. 2011. Does intellectual 
property rights spur industrial development? Journal of International Economics 83, no. 
1: 27–36. 
 
Breschi, S., F. Lissoni, and F. Malerba. 2004. The empirical assessment of firms’ 
technological coherence: data and methodology. In The economics and management of 
technological diversification, ed. J. Cantwell, A. Gambardella, and O. Granstrand, 68–
96. London: Routledge. 
 
Burhop, C. and N. Wolf. 2013. The German Market for Patents during the “Second 
Industrialization,” 1884-1913: A Gravity Approach. Business History Review 87, 
(Spring): 69–93.  
 
Chan, H.P. 2010. The Determinants of International Patenting for Nine Agricultural 
Biotechnology Firms. The Journal of Industrial Economics 58, no. 2: 247–77.  
 
Eaton J., and S. Kortum. 1996. Trade in ideas. Patenting and productivity in the OECD. 
Journal of International Economics 40, no. 3–4: 251–78. 
 
Eaton, J. and S. Kortum. 1999. International Technology Diffusion: Theory and 
Measurement. International Economic Review 40, no. 3: 537–70.  
 
Espacenet. 2010. Espacenet patent database. 
http://www.epo.org/searching/free/espacenet.html (accessed January, 2010). 
 
Evenson, R.E. 1984. International invention: Implications for technology market 
analysis. In R&D, patents and productivity, ed. Z. Griliches, 89–126. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
 
Gans, J.S. and S. Stern. 2010. Is there a market for ideas? Industrial and Corporate 
Change 19, no. 3: 805–37.  
 
Ginarte, J.C., and  W.G. Park. 1997. Determinants of patent rights: A cross-national 
study. Research Policy 26, no. 3: 283–301. 
 
Grossman, G.M., and E. Helpman. 1991a. Quality ladders in the theory of growth. 
Review of Economic Studies 58, no. 1: 43–61.  
 
Grossman, G.M., and E. Helpman. 1991b. Innovation and growth in global economy. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  
 
 25 
Hall, B., A.B. Jaffe, and M. Trajtenberg. 2002. The NBER patent-citations data file: 
Lessons, insights and methodological tools. In Patents, citations and innovations, ed. 
A.B. Jaffe, and M. Trajtenberg, 403–60. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
Hall, B., A.B. Jaffe and M. Trajtenberg. 2005. Market Value and Patent Citations. The 
RAND Journal of Economics 36, no. 1: 16–38. 
 
Harhoff, D., K. Hoisl, B. Reichl, and B. van Pottelsberghe. 2009. Patent validation at 
the country level. The role of fees and translation costs. Research Policy 38, no. 9: 
1423–37. 
 
Harhoff, D, F. Narin, F.M. Scherer and K. Vopel. 1999. Citation Frequency and the 
Value of Patented Inventions. Review of Economics and Statistics 81, no. 3: 511-15. 
 
Harhoff, D., M. Scherer, and K. Vopel. 2002. Citations, family size, opposition and 
value of patent rights. Research Policy 32, no. 8: 1343–63. 
 
Harison, E. 2008. Intellectual property rights, innovation and software technologies. 
The economics of monopoly rights and knowledge disclosure. Cheltenham, U.K., and 
Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar. 
 
Heckman, J. 1981. The incidental parameters problem and the problem of initial 
conditions in estimating a discrete time-discrete stochastic process. In The structural 
analysis of discrete data, ed. C. Manski, and D. McFadden, 179–95. Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press. 
 
Helfgott, S. 1993. Patent filing costs around the world. Journal of the Patent and 
Trademark Office Society 75, no. 7: 567–80. 
 
Helpman, E. 1993. Innovation, imitation and intellectual property rights. Econometrica 
61, no. 6: 1247–80. 
 
Hoekman, B., and M. Kostecki. 1995. The political economy of the world trading 
system. From GATT to WTO. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
 
Jaffe, A.B., and M. Trajtenberg. 2002. Patents, citations & innovations. A window on 
the knowledge economy. Cambridge MA: MIT Press.  
 
Lanjouw, J., A. Pakes, and J.D. Putnam. 1996. How to count patents and value 
intellectual property: Uses of patent renewal and application data. NBER working 
paper no. 5741. Cambridge, MA: NBER.  
 
Lanjouw, J., and M. Schankerman. 2001. Characteristics of patent litigation: A window 
on competition. RAND Journal of Economics 32, no. 1: 129–51. 
 
Lanjouw, J., and M. Schankerman. 2004. Patent Quality and Research Produtivity: 
Measuring Innovation with Multiple Indicators. The Economic Journal 114, no. 495: 
441–65. 
 
 26 
Levin, R.C., A.K. Klevorick, R.R. Nelson, and S.G. Winter. 1987. Appropriating the 
returns from industrial research and development. Brookings Papers on Economic 
Activity 1987, no. 3: 783–831. 
 
McCalman, P. 2001. Reaping what you sow: an empirical analysis of international 
patent harmonization. Journal of International Economics 55, no. 1: 161–86. 
 
McCalman, P. 2005. International diffusion and intellectual property rights: An 
empirical analysis. Journal of International Economics 67, no. 2: 353–72. 
 
Maskus, K.E. 2000. Intellectual property rights in the world economy. Washington, DC: 
Institute for International Economics. 
 
Maurseth, P.B. 2005. Lovely but dangerous: The Impact of patent citations on patent 
renewal. Economics of Innovation and New Technology 14, no. 5: 351–74. 
 
NBER. 2006. NBER patent database 2006. 
http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~bhhall/NBER06.html (accessed August, 2012). 
 
Pakes. A., and M. Schankerman. 1984. The rate of obsolescence of patents, research 
gestation lags and the private return to research resources. In R&D, patents and 
productivity, ed. Z. Griliches, 73–88. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Pakes, A. and M. Simpson. 1989. Patent Renewal Data. Brookings Papers of Economic 
Activity, Microeconomics, 331-410. 
 
Park, W.G. 2008. International patent protection: 1960–2005. Research Policy 37, no. 4: 
761–66. 
 
Penrose, E. 1951. The Economics of the International Patent System. Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins Press. 
 
Putnam, J.D. 1996. The value of international patent rights. Ph.D. thesis. Yale 
University. 
 
Schankerman, M. 1998. How Valuable is Patent Protection? Estimates by Technology 
Field. The RAND Journal of Economics 29, no. 1: 77-107. 
 
Schankerman, M. and A. Pakes. 1986. Estimates of Value of Patents Rights in the 
European Countries during the Post-1950 Period. Economic Journal 96: 1052-76. 
 
Schmoch, U., H. Grupp, W. Mannsbart, and B. Schwitalla. 1988. Technikprognosen mit 
Patentindikatoren. Köln: Verlag TÜV Rheinland. 
 
Scotchmer, S. 2004. Innovation and incentives. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  
 
Serrano, C.J. 2010. The dynamics of the transfer and renewal of patents. The RAND 
Journal of Economics 41, no. 4: 686–708.  
 
 27 
Slama, J. 1981. Analysis by means of gravitation model of international flows of patent 
applications in the period 1967–1978. World Patent Information 3, no. 1: 2–8. 
 
StataCorp. 2007. Stata Statistical Software: Release 10. College Station, TX: StataCorp 
LP. 
 
Svensson, R. 2012. Commercialization, renewal and patent quality. Economics of 
Innovation and New Technology 21, no. 1–2: 175–201. 
 
Van Pottelsberghe, B. 2009. Lost property: the European patent system and why it 
doesn’t work. Brussels: Bruegel Blueprint. 
 
Van Pottelsberghe, B. 2010. Europe should stop taxing innovation. Bruegel Policy Brief 
2010/02. 
 
Van Pottelsberghe, B., and D. Francois. 2009. The cost factor in patent systems. Journal 
of Industry, Competition and Trade 9, no. 4: 329–55.  
 
Van Zeebroeck, N. 2011. The puzzle of patent value indicators. Economics of 
Innovation and New Technology 20, no. 1: 33–62. 
 
Van Zeebroeck, N., and  B. van Pottelsberghe. 2011. The vulnerability of patent value 
determinants. Economics of Innovation and New Technology 20, no. 3: 283–308. 
 
WIPO. 2011. World intellectual property indicators, 2011 edition. 
http://www.wipo.int/ipstats/en/ (accessed July, 2012). 
 
WIPO. 2013. WIPO statistical country profiles, 2013 edition. 
http://www.wipo.int/ipstats/en/statistics/patents/ (accessed August, 2013). 
 
World Bank. 2011. World development indicators. 
http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do (accessed June, 2012). 
 
 28 
Appendix A 
 
Table A1. Basic information about patent equivalents and costs. 
Country No. of patent 
equivalents 
of which  
via EPO 
EPO member  
in 1998 
Costs available 
(Helfgott 1993) 
United States 224  0 Yes 
Canada   41  0 Yes 
Brazil     5  0 Yes 
     
EPO 217 217 --- Yes 
Germany 210 195 1 Yes 
Great Britain 177 174 1 Yes 
France 150 148 1 Yes 
Netherlands   80   79 1 Yes 
Belgium   45   45 1 No 
Ireland   34   34 1 No 
Switzerland   57   56 1 Yes 
Austria   42   41 1 Yes 
Italy   87   87 1 Yes 
Spain   82   82 1 Yes 
Portugal   21   21 1 No 
Greece   17   17 1 Yes 
Denmark   65   62 1 Yes 
Finland   62   58 1 Yes 
Luxembourg     3     3 1 Yes 
Cyprus     2     2 1 No 
     
Norway   38  0 Yes 
Monaco     4  0 No 
Russia   16  0 No 
Estonia     1  0 No 
Poland   21  0 No 
Czech Republic     5  0 No 
Hungary     2  0 No 
Romania     1  0 No 
Bulgaria     3  0 No 
     
Japan 141  0 Yes 
China   37  0 No 
Hong Kong     4  0 No 
Taiwan     1  0 Yes 
Korea, Rep.     1  0 Yes 
Australia   53  0 Yes 
New Zealand     1  0 Yes 
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Table A2. Explanatory variables and hypotheses. 
Denotation Description Model Mean Std. dev. 
Expected 
impact 
GDP 
GROW 
 
RDGDP 
 
GDPCAP 
 
NRCA 
COST 
PARK95 
Log of GDP in the host country in 1995 (USD) 
Annual growth rate in GDP in the host country 
1990−2000 (percent) 
R&D expenditures per GDP in the host country in 1995 
(percent) 
Log of GDP per capita in the host country in 1995 (USD, 
PPP) 
Normalized RCA, see appendix C 
Log of total patenting costs in the host country (USD) 
Unweighted average of scores for five IPR indicators 
Y 
g 
 
k 
 
k 
 
k 
C 
---- 
25.8 
2.56 
 
1.46 
 
9.85 
 
−0.07 
−1.68 
3.81 
1.91 
1.64 
 
0.83 
 
0.70 
 
0.40 
0.75 
0.75 
+ 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
- 
+ 
COM 
 
ALIVE 
 
CIT 
 
CITwi 
 
 
CITbe 
 
Dummy which equals 1 if the patent was 
commercialized, and 0 otherwise 
Dummy which equals 1 if the main patent was still valid 
in 2004, and 0 otherwise 
Number of forward citations per five year period between 
application date and 2007, weighted by IPC classes 
Number of forward citations within IPC classes per five 
year period between application date and 2007, weighted 
by IPC classes 
Number of forward citations between IPC classes per five 
year period between application date and 2007, weighted 
by IPC classes 
λ 
 
λ 
 
λ 
 
λ 
 
 
λ 
 
0.61 
 
0.56 
 
0.88 
 
0.85 
 
 
0.47 
 
0.49 
 
0.50 
 
1.49 
 
1.50 
 
 
1.85 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
 
+ 
MED 
 
SMALL 
 
MICRO 
Dummy which equals one if patent is owned by a 
medium-sized firm (101−1000 employees) 
Dummy which equals one if patent is owned by a small 
firm (101−1000 employees) 
Dummy which equals one if patent is owned by a micro 
company (101−1000 employees) 
---- 
 
---- 
 
---- 
0.13 
 
0.23 
 
0.16 
0.34 
 
0.42 
 
0.37 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
DIST 
 
EXPSH 
 
EPOmemb 
Log of distance in kilometers between Sweden and the 
host country 
Share of Swedish exports to the country in question 
(percent) 
Dummy which equals 1 if the country was an EPO-
member in 1998 
---- 
 
---- 
 
---- 
7.72 
 
0.04 
 
0.47 
1.01 
 
0.10 
 
0.49 
- 
 
+ 
 
? 
YEAR  
Industry 
dummies 
Patent application year (range 1985−98) 
30 different industry dummies based on IPC (not 
mutually exclusive) 
---- 
---- 
1995 
---- 
1.65 
---- 
? 
? 
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Appendix B.  
 
Inclusion of EPO-patents in the analysis 
 
In the text we excluded EPO-patents since these were counted as patents in each 
individual country. Inclusion of EPO as an additional entity (in addition to each member 
country) therefore constitutes double counting of these patents. A dummy variable for 
whether countries are members of EPO was included, however. Nevertheless, patenting 
via EPO represents a patent protection decision, giving potential for IPRs in the wider 
EPO area of jurisdiction. Therefore, protection through EPO is a decision that is 
different from granted patents in each individual country.  
 
Table B1. Regression results, random effects probit model, including EPO. 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 
GDP 0.63*** 
(0.032) 
0.63*** 
(0.032) 
0.63*** 
(0.032) 
0.63*** 
(0.032) 
0.63*** 
(0.032) 
0.63*** 
(0.032) 
GROW 0.13*** 
(0.018) 
0.13*** 
(0.018) 
0.13*** 
(0.018) 
0.13*** 
(0.018) 
0.13*** 
(0.018) 
0.13*** 
(0.018) 
RDGDP 0.10*** 
(0.033) 
0.10*** 
(0.033) 
0.10*** 
(0.033) 
0.10*** 
(0.033) 
0.10*** 
(0.033) 
0.10*** 
(0.033) 
GDPCAP 0.36*** 
(0.045) 
0.36*** 
(0.045) 
0.36***  
(0.045) 
0.36*** 
(0.045) 
0.36*** 
(0.045) 
0.36*** 
(0.045) 
NRCA 0.43*** 
(0.067) 
0.43*** 
(0.067) 
0.43*** 
(0.067) 
0.44*** 
(0.067) 
0.44*** 
(0.067) 
0.44*** 
(0.067) 
COM.  1.10*** 
(0.159) 
   0.74*** 
(0.146) 
ALIVE   1.42*** 
(0.153) 
  1.13*** 
(0.146) 
CIT    0.47*** 
(0.044) 
  
CITwi     0.40*** 
(0.043) 
0.35*** 
(0.040) 
CITbe     0.16*** 
(0.032) 
0.14*** 
(0.029) 
MED 0.95*** 
(0.222) 
0.79*** 
(0.218) 
0.55*** 
(0.211) 
0.75*** 
(0.214) 
0.71*** 
(0.211) 
0.32 
(0.197) 
SMALL 0.55*** 
(0.189) 
0.37** 
(0.187) 
0.29 
(0.181) 
0.40** 
(0.183) 
0.39** 
(0.181) 
0.08 
(0.170) 
MICRO 0.77*** 
(0.206) 
0.54*** 
(0.203) 
0.56*** 
(0.196) 
0.67*** 
(0.199) 
0.62*** 
(0.197) 
0.33* 
(0.183) 
DIST −0.32*** 
(0.037) 
−0.32*** 
(0.037) 
−0.32*** 
(0.037) 
−0.32*** 
(0.037) 
−0.32*** 
(0.037) 
−0.32*** 
(0.037) 
EXPSH 3.86*** 
(1.076) 
3.85*** 
(1.075) 
3.80*** 
(1.069) 
3.93*** 
(1.080) 
3.91*** 
1.075) 
3.84*** 
(1.068) 
EPO −2.39*** −2.39*** −2.36*** −2.42*** −2.41*** −2.38*** 
 (0.498) (0.498) (0.495) (0.498) (0.498) (0.495) 
YEAR 0.08* 
(0.044) 
0.08* 
(0.044) 
0.07 
(0.042) 
0.08* 
(0.043) 
0.091** 
(0.043) 
0.08* 
(0.040) 
ρ 0.76*** 
(0.017) 
0.74*** 
(0.018) 
0.72*** 
(0.019) 
0.72*** 
(0.019) 
0.74*** 
(0.018) 
0.67*** 
(0.022) 
n 29,478 29,478 29,478 29,478 29,478 29,478 
Note: The dependent variable is the existence of patent equivalent of patent i in country j. Std. errors in 
parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%-, 5%- and 10%-level, respectively. All 
estimations include 30 industry dummies (unreported). 
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Table B1 reports regression results from regressions where EPO patents are included as 
an observation for each patent (in addition to all the other included observations). A 
dummy variable for the 867 EPO observations is included in addition to the other 
variables, but the dummy variable for membership in EPO for individual countries is 
excluded. Thus, Table B1 resembles Table 4 in all respects except that there are 867 
extra observations (with a separate dummy for these), and with no dummy for EPO 
members. Table B1 does not include the patent quality variable PARK95 since this is 
not calculated for EPO. The results are mainly in line with those in the main text. The 
dummy for EPO is negative and significant. This is consistent with expectations, since 
granted patents in each individual member country are also included. We also estimated 
the same models with inclusion of the patent costs variable, and the results are mainly in 
line with the other variables. They are available upon request.  
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Derivation of equation 8 
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Now let λi denote a vector of patent specific characteristics for patent i. These capture 
the quality indicators described in the text. Write the quality of patent i as qi = qλiβ. That 
is, the quality of patent i depends on individual specific characteristics, as well as 
drawing from the random variable Q. For patenting to occur, parameter restrictions are 
such that qi>0. A patent of quality qi will therefore be patented in country j  if qij 
exceeds the right hand side of eq. 8. Accordingly, the threshold value for a patent i to be 
patented in country j equals:  
 
9) 
( )( )







 −+−
−





−=
kY
gkrgrC
q
j
jjj
ij 1ln
1*
βλ i
 
 
We assume that r>g. This implies that patentees’ discounting rates from profits in the 
relevant countries, net of growth rates, are positive. Therefore 0<[1/(r-g)-1/(r+k-g)]<1. 
Given these assumptions, the derivations reported in Lemma in the main text hold. 
Given that the last term in the parenthesis is less than one, expressions 8 and 9 give a 
positive threshold value for the quality of inventions for which only higher valued 
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inventions are patented. We also assume that patent costs relative to GDP are smaller 
than the difference between effective discounting rates, with and without patenting, 
C/Y<[1/(r-g)-1/(r+k-g)]. If this is not fulfilled, no inventions will be patented.  
 
 
Appendix D 
 
RCA and normalized RCA 
 
Let Xsj denote country j’s number of patents in IPC class s. The RCA is given as: 
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RCA  
 
RCAsj therefore denotes country j’s specialization in technology class s, relative to the 
global specialization in the same technology class. The RCA index varies from zero to 
infinity and is generally asymmetric. We normalized it to (RCA-1)/(RCA+1) to arrive at 
a symmetric measure. Each patent according to its IPC class is therefore assigned a 
value of the normalized RCA index for each country. When a patent was assigned to 
more than one technology class, we used an average. 
 
The advantage of using the NBER patent database to construct the above index is that, 
since the database is based on patents granted by USPTO, it is fairly robust to 
international differences in patent institutions. We therefore expect the index to provide 
a fairly good impression of countries’ technological specialization vis-à-vis the patent in 
question.  
                                                 
1 See e.g. Maskus (2000), Birdsall, Rodrik and Subramanian (2005), Helpman (1993) and Branstetter et 
al. (2011). 
2 Multilateral cooperation in the field of IPRs was extended after the Paris convention with an increasing 
number of member states and several new agreements, e.g. Scotchmer (2004) or Maskus (2000). In 
Hoekman and Kostecki (1995) the road from GATT to the WTO (and the TRIPS) is discussed and 
analyzed. Japan, Europe and the U.S. have the largest patent institutions internationally, in terms of 
number of patents. Traditionally, the three areas have differed according to national priorities. However, 
although they have in recent years converged considerably, there are still some differences (see e.g. 
Harison 2008). 
3 PCT = Patent Cooperation Treaty. The PCT system does not provide for the grant of an international 
patent, but it: 1) simplifies the process of filing patent applications in individual countries; 2) delays the 
expenses associated with applying for patent protection in other countries; and 3) allows the inventor 
more time to assess the commercial viability of his invention. Under the PCT, an inventor can file a single 
international patent application for an invention in one language with one patent office in order to 
simultaneously seek protection in up to 148 countries throughout the world. 
4 If a patent is granted by EPO, the national patent offices always have to follow this decision. 
5 Developments in the USA and Japan reflect the size of these countries’ home markets. 
6 A related, but different literature focuses on licensing and transfers of patent rights. Also elements of 
this literature studies international trade in patent rights. Burhop and Wolf (2013) apply this approach on 
historical German data. Akcigit, Celik and Greenwood (2013) construct a model for the market for 
patents and test it on empirical data. Related studies are Serrano (2010) and Gans and Stern (2010). An 
overview is provided in Arora and Gambardella (2010).  
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7 Abrams et al. (2013) and Maurseth (2005) qualify the assumption that forward patent citations signal 
higher value of a patent. Abrams et al. argue that defensive but economic important patents are cited less 
than other patents. Maurseth argues that patent citations within narrowly defined technology classes 
signal rival patents that render the cited patent obsolete.  
8 Abrams et al. (2013) however, argue that many valuable patents are defensive and that these are cited 
less than other patents. Defensive patents are not likely to be commercialized. Related is Svensson 
(2012). 
9 In 1998, 2,760 patents were granted in Sweden. 776 of these were granted to foreign firms, 902 to large 
Swedish firms with more than a 1,000 employees, and 1,082 to Swedish individuals or firms with less 
than a 1,000 employees. In a pilot survey carried out in 2002, it turned out that large Swedish firms 
refused to provide information on individual patents. Furthermore, it proved very difficult to persuade 
foreign firms to answer questionnaires about patents. The foreign firms are almost always large 
multinationals. However, the sample selection in our data is not a problem insofar as the conclusions are 
drawn for small firms and individual inventors located in Sweden. 
10 Of the 20 percent non-respondents, 10 percent of the inventors had outdated addresses, 5 percent had 
correct addresses but did not respond, and the remaining 5 percent refused to participate. The only 
information we have about the non-respondents is the IPC-class of the patent and the region of the 
inventors. For these variables, there was no systematic difference between respondents and non-
respondents. 
11 This average number of equivalents is the same as for EPO-patents in general (van Zeebroeck 2011). 
12 For example, the mean number of patent equivalents for an invention with a patent equivalent in the 
U.S. is 5.8. A patent with an equivalent in Estonia (or Romania) occurred only once. These had 24 
equivalents (both for the Estonian and the Romanian cases). 
13. In Sweden patent owners must pay an annual renewal fee to the relevant patent office in order to keep 
their patents in force. The patent expires if the renewal fee is not paid in any single year. Thus, the patent 
owner has an option to renew the patent every year. 
14 For similar formulations of the above relationships, see Eaton and Kortum (1996) or Grossman and 
Helpman (1991a or 1991b, chapter 4). 
15 It is not difficult to generalize to a reduction in imitation rates from any knopatent to any kpatent. Also, it is 
a simple task to introduce a statutory maximum lifetime for patents. This complicates the derived 
empirical specifications without adding clarity. 
16 Eaton and Kortum (1996) propose an exponential distribution. The average step of an invention can 
then be parameterized as 1/θ. 
17 We lack country data for Taiwan, for which there is one granted patent. Some results included in the 
appendix are also for EPO-patents in addition to granted patents in the individual EPO member countries. 
This expanded the data set by 867 extra observations, to 30,345. 
18 We use 1995 as the year for level variables since patents granted in 1998 were applied for in previous 
years. We use growth in the period 1990 to 2000 to capture growth experience and expectations at the 
granting date. 
19 But high levels of R&D in a country could also reflect economic conditions in the country that are 
favorable to demand for the patented invention. 
20 GDP per capita can also, however, reflect influence from the demand side, for instance because of non-
homothetic preferences. 
21 Another problem is that the cost data seems to be old. The patents covered by our database were 
granted in 1998, but applied for the 1992−96 period. The costs reported in Helfgott (1993) are therefore 
somewhat low as compared to the costs faced by the applicants in our dataset (due to inflation), but does 
not constitute a serious problem as the application years are not far from 1993. Further, we do not know 
whether or not they changed proportionally to each other. A second problem is how patent costs via EPO 
are reported. These should include validation costs in individual countries to reflect the costs faced by the 
Swedish firms when applying for patent equivalents in other EPO member countries. However, we do not 
have access to these validation costs. 
22 The index is available for 32 of the 34 countries in our sample. We lack observation of this index for 
Estonia and Macedonia. The dataset is then reduced to 867*32 = 27,744 observations. 
23 EXPSH is taken from the COMTRADE database and supplemental data for Hong Kong from Statistics 
Sweden. This variable is included at the cost of observations for Monaco. 
24 Note that the patentee does not know the actual examination period at the time of application. In the 
literature, inexperienced patentees and requests for accelerated search have been identified as correlated 
with patent consideration time at the patent offices (see van Zeebroeck and van Pottelsberghe 2011). 
25 We exclude patents granted by EPO since they are also reported as patents in individual EPO countries. 
See appendix B for estimations where these applications were included. 
